The Ben-Pelechs raised two grounds of appeal:
Ground 1:
Essentially, this was a re-agitation of their s 163 TLA arguments, that:
- the section’s effect was that upon verification of a plan of subdivision, any estate or interest in the land the subject of that plan which is not noted on that plan is determined; and
- any person, who has an estate or interest in land that is injured by the operation of s 163, is entitled to compensation in the form of damages only.
and further to this,
- the Ben-Pelechs' plan of subdivision was verified on 1 November 2017 – this plan included their new subdivided lot 200;
- and consequently, at that date, the Royles' interest in lot 200, claimed by way of adverse possession, was determined.
The Court of Appeal rejected this ground on the basis:
- s 163 is confined to a situation where the Commissioner of Titles has prepared a subdivision scheme under s 160, which ‘had no application to the present case’1;
- it was ‘plain beyond dispute’ that ss 160-165 form an interlocking scheme, accordingly s 163 could not be read in isolation as the Ben-Pelechs invited, but had to be read in the context of the sections which surround it. The judgment lists 11 indicators that support this construction.2
Ground 2:
The Ben-Pelechs claimed that the trial judge erred in finding the Royles' possession of the rear area was adverse for the purposes of an adverse possession claim, on the basis that in making their agreement as to the construction and location of the fence, the parties impliedly agreed that to the extent that the fence was not located on the boundary, each party consented to the other party's use of the land behind the fence that belonged to the consenting party. This implication was said to arise as a matter of fact.
The Court of Appeal found the Ben-Pelechs did not consent in any relevant sense to the Royles' occupation of their land, and that ground 2 failed. In summary, this was because:
- the test to imply a term – namely, that it is ‘necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of a contract of that nature in the circumstances of the case’ was not satisfied;3 and
- there was no basis to suppose that the parties contemplated the part of the land belonging to one party would be on the other party’s side of the replacement fence;4
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